/*
* @(#)SecurityPermission.java 1.29 06/10/10
*
* Copyright 1990-2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version
* 2 only, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License version 2 for more details (a copy is
* included at /legal/license.txt).
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* version 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA
* 02110-1301 USA
*
* Please contact Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
* Clara, CA 95054 or visit www.sun.com if you need additional
* information or have any questions.
*
*/
package java.security;
import java.security.*;
import java.util.Enumeration;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.StringTokenizer;
/**
* This class is for security permissions.
* A SecurityPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name")
* but no actions list; you either have the named permission
* or you don't.
* <P>
* The target name is the name of a security configuration parameter (see below).
* Currently the SecurityPermission object is used to guard access
* to the Policy, Security, Provider, Signer, and Identity
* objects.
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Signer, java.security.Identity</B> are found in J2ME
* CDC profiles such as J2ME Foundation Profile.
* <P>
* The following table lists all the possible SecurityPermission target names,
* and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
* and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
* <P>
*
* <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="target name,what the permission allows, and associated risks">
* <tr>
* <th>Permission Target Name</th>
* <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
* <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>createAccessControlContext</td>
* <td>Creation of an AccessControlContext</td>
* <td>This allows someone to instantiate an AccessControlContext
* with a <code>DomainCombiner</code>. Since DomainCombiners are given
* a reference to the ProtectionDomains currently on the stack,
* this could potentially lead to a privacy leak if the DomainCombiner
* is malicious.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getDomainCombiner</td>
* <td>Retrieval of an AccessControlContext's DomainCombiner</td>
* <td>This allows someone to retrieve an AccessControlContext's
* <code>DomainCombiner</code>. Since DomainCombiners may contain
* sensitive information, this could potentially lead to a privacy leak.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getPolicy</td>
* <td>Retrieval of the system-wide security policy (specifically, of the
* currently-installed Policy object)</td>
* <td>This allows someone to query the policy via the
* <code>getPermissions</code> call,
* which discloses which permissions would be granted to a given CodeSource.
* While revealing the policy does not compromise the security of
* the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information
* which it may use to better aim an attack. It is wise
* not to divulge more information than necessary.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setPolicy</td>
* <td>Setting of the system-wide security policy (specifically,
* the Policy object)</td>
* <td>Granting this permission is extremely dangerous, as malicious
* code may grant itself all the necessary permissions it needs
* to successfully mount an attack on the system.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getProperty.{key}</td>
* <td>Retrieval of the security property with the specified key</td>
* <td>Depending on the particular key for which access has
* been granted, the code may have access to the list of security
* providers, as well as the location of the system-wide and user
* security policies. while revealing this information does not
* compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious
* code with additional information which it may use to better aim
* an attack.
</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setProperty.{key}</td>
* <td>Setting of the security property with the specified key</td>
* <td>This could include setting a security provider or defining
* the location of the the system-wide security policy. Malicious
* code that has permission to set a new security provider may
* set a rogue provider that steals confidential information such
* as cryptographic private keys. In addition, malicious code with
* permission to set the location of the system-wide security policy
* may point it to a security policy that grants the attacker
* all the necessary permissions it requires to successfully mount
* an attack on the system.
</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>insertProvider.{provider name}</td>
* <td>Addition of a new provider, with the specified name</td>
* <td>This would allow somebody to introduce a possibly
* malicious provider (e.g., one that discloses the private keys passed
* to it) as the highest-priority provider. This would be possible
* because the Security object (which manages the installed providers)
* currently does not check the integrity or authenticity of a provider
* before attaching it.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>removeProvider.{provider name}</td>
* <td>Removal of the specified provider</td>
* <td>This may change the behavior or disable execution of other
* parts of the program. If a provider subsequently requested by the
* program has been removed, execution may fail. Also, if the removed
* provider is not explicitly requested by the rest of the program, but
* it would normally be the provider chosen when a cryptography service
* is requested (due to its previous order in the list of providers),
* a different provider will be chosen instead, or no suitable provider
* will be found, thereby resulting in program failure.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setSystemScope</td>
* <td>Setting of the system identity scope</td>
* <td>This would allow an attacker to configure the system identity scope with
* certificates that should not be trusted, thereby granting applet or
* application code signed with those certificates privileges that
* would have been denied by the system's original identity scope</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setIdentityPublicKey</td>
* <td>Setting of the public key for an Identity
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Identity</B> is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as
* J2ME Foundation Profile. </td>
* <td>If the identity is marked as "trusted", this allows an attacker to
* introduce a different public key (e.g., its own) that is not trusted
* by the system's identity scope, thereby granting applet or
* application code signed with that public key privileges that
* would have been denied otherwise.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setIdentityInfo</td>
* <td>Setting of a general information string for an Identity
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Identity</B> is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as
* J2ME Foundation Profile. </td>
* <td>This allows attackers to set the general description for
* an identity. This may trick applications into using a different
* identity than intended or may prevent applications from finding a
* particular identity.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>addIdentityCertificate</td>
* <td>Addition of a certificate for an Identity
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Identity</B> is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as
* J2ME Foundation Profile.</td>
* <td>This allows attackers to set a certificate for
* an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects
* the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly
* becomes trusted to a wider audience than it otherwise would be.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>removeIdentityCertificate</td>
* <td>Removal of a certificate for an Identity
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Identity</B> is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as
* J2ME Foundation Profile.</td>
* <td>This allows attackers to remove a certificate for
* an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects
* the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly
* becomes considered less trustworthy than it otherwise would be.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>printIdentity</td>
* <td>Viewing the name of a principal
* and optionally the scope in which it is used, and whether
* or not it is considered "trusted" in that scope</td>
* <td>The scope that is printed out may be a filename, in which case
* it may convey local system information. For example, here's a sample
* printout of an identity named "carol", who is
* marked not trusted in the user's identity database:<br>
* carol[/home/luehe/identitydb.obj][not trusted]</td>
*</tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>clearProviderProperties.{provider name}</td>
* <td>"Clearing" of a Provider so that it no longer contains the properties
* used to look up services implemented by the provider</td>
* <td>This disables the lookup of services implemented by the provider.
* This may thus change the behavior or disable execution of other
* parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as
* described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>putProviderProperty.{provider name}</td>
* <td>Setting of properties for the specified Provider</td>
* <td>The provider properties each specify the name and location
* of a particular service implemented by the provider. By granting
* this permission, you let code replace the service specification
* with another one, thereby specifying a different implementation.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>removeProviderProperty.{provider name}</td>
* <td>Removal of properties from the specified Provider</td>
* <td>This disables the lookup of services implemented by the
* provider. They are no longer accessible due to removal of the properties
* specifying their names and locations. This
* may change the behavior or disable execution of other
* parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as
* described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getSignerPrivateKey</td>
* <td>Retrieval of a Signer's private key</td>
* <td>It is very dangerous to allow access to a private key; private
* keys are supposed to be kept secret. Otherwise, code can use the
* private key to sign various files and claim the signature came from
* the Signer.
* NOTE: <B>java.security.Signer</B> is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as
* J2ME Foundation Profile.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setSignerKeyPair</td>
* <td>Setting of the key pair (public key and private key) for a Signer</td>
* <td>This would allow an attacker to replace somebody else's (the "target's")
* keypair with a possibly weaker keypair (e.g., a keypair of a smaller
* keysize). This also would allow the attacker to listen in on encrypted
* communication between the target and its peers. The target's peers
* might wrap an encryption session key under the target's "new" public
* key, which would allow the attacker (who possesses the corresponding
* private key) to unwrap the session key and decipher the communication
* data encrypted under that session key.</td>
* </tr>
*
* </table>
*
* @see java.security.BasicPermission
* @see java.security.Permission
* @see java.security.Permissions
* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
*
* @version 1.21 00/02/02
*
* @author Marianne Mueller
* @author Roland Schemers
*/
public final class SecurityPermission extends BasicPermission {
/**
* Creates a new SecurityPermission with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the SecurityPermission. An asterisk
* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
* signify a wildcard match.
*
* @param name the name of the SecurityPermission
*/
public SecurityPermission(String name)
{
super(name);
}
/**
* Creates a new SecurityPermission object with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the SecurityPermission, and the
* actions String is currently unused and should be null.
*
* @param name the name of the SecurityPermission
* @param actions should be null.
*/
public SecurityPermission(String name, String actions)
{
super(name, actions);
}
}